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WHAT’S THE POINT OF PARITY? HARVARD, 




ABSTRACT—Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) v. Harvard—a case 
alleging racial discrimination against Asian applicants in 
undergraduate admissions on appeal to the First Circuit—is one of the 
most notable recent equal protection challenges to be advanced almost 
exclusively on the basis of statistical evidence. The case could well 
end affirmative action in higher education and beyond if it winds up 
at the Supreme Court. However, the central issue in this case is not an 
evidentiary question about what is probative of discrimination; it is a 
substantive question about what constitutes discrimination. The 
plaintiffs SFFA put forward a substantive definition of racial 
nondiscrimination—group-based conditional parity—under which 
equal protection is denied if applicants grouped by race do not face 
similar likelihood of admission conditional on having similar 
credentials. Neither Harvard, in defending their affirmative action 
practices, nor the trial judge, in ostensibly favoring Harvard’s expert 
findings, meaningfully countered SFFA’s definition of discrimination. 
This Essay argues that there is no good normative reason to accept this 
definition of what equal protection demands in the context of higher 
education admissions because it will be violated whenever groups sit 
in some relation of social and material inequality to each other. 
Furthermore, it is at odds with the Supreme Court’s line of cases 
allowing universities to value racial diversity and the graded scrutiny 
scale in the equal protection doctrine. Before to debating the content 
of a substantive principle of nondiscrimination/equal protection with 
respect to a particular form of groupness, we must first define what 
constitutes that form of social groupness. A relation of equality and 
fairness proposed by a principle of ‘nondiscrimination’ or ‘equal 
protection’ is only valid in light of what makes the social grouping 
what it is under current conditions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There has been long standing debate—to put it mildly—raging over 
which forms of equality the Equal Protection Clause protects.1 Students for 
Fair Admissions, Inc. (SFFA) v. Harvard, a challenge to the undergraduate 
admissions practices at (you guessed it) Harvard pending for almost five 
years now,2 offers yet another opportunity to debate this question with 
respect to racial equality. The case was spearheaded by a long-time critic of 
affirmative action, Edward Blum, representing a group whose mission 
statement is that, “[a] student’s race and ethnicity should not be factors that 
either harm or help that student to gain admission to a competitive 
 
 1 See infra text accompanying notes 13–15. The entire “equality of what” debate in egalitarianism is 
about this same issue. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods and Capabilities, 
56 LOUVAIN ECON. REV. 357, 357 (1990); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 1: Equality of 
Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185, 185 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of 
Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 283 (1981); AMARTYA SEN, Equality of What?, in EQUAL 
FREEDOM: SELECTED TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 307, 307 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995). And 
for a brilliant critique of the terms in which this debate are framed, see Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is 
the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 287 (1999). 
 2 Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (SFFA) v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. (Harvard Corp.), 
397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 132–33 (D. Mass. 2019). 
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university.”3 Last September, a Massachusetts federal district court issued an 
opinion upholding Harvard’s admission practices against that equal 
protection challenge.4 As the appeal winds its way up—possibly to the 
Supreme Court—the case could well decide the fate of affirmative action 
well beyond elite universities. But the case is important for another reason: 
it exposes a missing conceptual piece in this long-running debate about how 
to interpret the demands of equal protection. It also perfectly illustrates why 
missing that piece creates an incoherent legal doctrine, especially in the area 
of affirmative action. 
Most approaches in law and social science define racial discrimination 
as the dissimilar treatment of persons in different racial groups who are 
similarly situated, at least with respect to variables rationally relevant to the 
domain in question. The plaintiff SFFA’s expert reports and legal arguments 
track that definition. SFFA proposes that statistical evidence demonstrating 
that applicants grouped by racial affiliations with similar observable 
qualifications face different probabilities of admission means that Harvard’s 
admissions process is discriminatory.5 That is, plaintiffs contend that group-
based conditional parity—similar likelihood of admission for applicants 
grouped by race, conditional on having similar credentials—is the 
substantive form of racial equality demanded by equal protection in college 
admissions. Harvard’s statistical expert largely accepted that definition of 
discrimination, as did the U.S. District Judge, Allison D. Burroughs, who 
decided the case.6 
This Essay argues that the plaintiffs’ proffered principle of which form 
of equality the Equal Protection Clause protects in the context of college 
admissions is deeply flawed. It is flawed both as a normative and as a legal 
matter. The problem with SFFA’s definition of discrimination is that it fails 
to explain why group-based conditional parity is the proper relation of 
equality for this specific form of groupness by reference to what constitutes 
‘race’ as a social grouping.7 An allegation that a practice treats people 
unequally by virtue of racial groupness can only be settled by appealing to a 
principle that evaluates the practice in light of what racial groupings are. It 
cannot be settled by reference to a principle formulated by abstracting (or 
assuming) away the social facts that make up the form of groupness we know 
 
 3 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, https://studentsforfairadmissions.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/54Z2-MRBB]. 
 4 SFFA, 397 F. Supp. 3d at 205–06. 
 5 Id. at 163. 
 6 See, e.g., id. at 163–64, 172–73. 
 7 I will use single quotation marks to denote concepts and double quotation marks to denote verbatim 
quotes throughout. 
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of as ‘race.’ Principles of the latter variety are just nonresponsive to claims 
of racial inequality. Furthermore, only principles of the former variety are 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s entire graded scrutiny scale in equal 
protection doctrine and its line of cases allowing universities to value racial 
diversity. 
Although it is hardly debatable that this case was brought with the 
express purpose of dismantling affirmative action in higher education and 
beyond,8 a number of commentators have argued that the case nonetheless 
raises real and serious issues about admissions practices that stereotype 
Asian applicants and discriminate against them by limiting their enrollment 
at Harvard.9 Plaintiffs SFFA proffered substantial evidence that the relation 
of conditional parity was violated with respect to Asian vis-à-vis white 
applicants.10 But they proffered even more dramatic evidence that it is 
violated between Asian vis-à-vis Black and Hispanic applicants (which the 
plaintiffs’ expert repeatedly highlights in his reports), and between white vis-
à-vis Black and Hispanic applicants.11 Many held out hope for a ruling that 
would remedy the alleged artificial suppression of Asian enrollment vis-à-
vis white applicants without threatening the legal status of affirmative action 
for African-American and Hispanic applicants. 
Both Harvard, in defending their affirmative action practices, and the 
judge, in ostensibly favoring Harvard’s expert findings, declined to counter 
the content of SFFA’s definition of discrimination. In so doing, they failed 
to offer a principled and sensical defense of the policy in the face of the 
(almost exclusively) statistical evidence proffered by the plaintiffs.12 The 
central issue in this case was not an evidentiary question about what was 
probative of discrimination, but rather a substantive question about what 
 
 8 See, e.g., Alex Beam, The True Mission of the Lawsuit Against Harvard, BOS. GLOBE (June 25, 
2018, 9:49 AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/06/25/the-true-mission-lawsuit-against-
harvard/5ESyvmBDmCxDvkbIdsxcrO/story.html [https://perma.cc/636T-AXQ5]; Alvin Chang, Asians 
Are Being Used to Make the Case Against Affirmative Action. Again., VOX (Aug. 30, 2018, 1:19 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/3/28/17031460/affirmative-action-asian-discrimination-admissions 
[https://perma.cc/2KEL-A5HS]. 
 9 Andrew Gelman, Sharad Goel & Daniel E. Ho, What Statistics Can’t Tell Us in the Fight over 
Affirmative Action at Harvard, BOS. REV. (Jan. 14, 2019), http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/andrew-
gelman-sharad-goel-daniel-e-ho-what-statistics-cant-tell-us-fight-over [https://perma.cc/A2DM-GXBE]; 
Jeannie Suk Gersen, Anti-Asian Bias, Not Affirmative Action, Is on Trial in the Harvard Case, NEW 
YORKER (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/anti-asian-bias-not-
affirmative-action-is-on-trial-in-the-harvard-case [https://perma.cc/6JN6-AYLC]. 
 10 See infra Section II. 
 11 See infra Section II. 
 12 ”This statistical evidence is perhaps the most important evidence in reaching a resolution of this 
case, given SFFA’s heavy reliance on the data to make out its claims.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. 
(SFFA) v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. (Harvard Corp.), 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 158 (D. Mass. 
2019). 
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constitutes discrimination. Without addressing that question, it was 
impossible to even contemplate a remedy that could have addressed practices 
between white and Asian applicants while preserving affirmative action for 
Black and Hispanic applicants. I fear the kind of reasoning that won the day 
in this case will, more often than not, be used to limit the reach of future 
antidiscrimination and equal protection plaintiffs in domains well beyond 
elite education. 
I. WHAT FORM OF EQUALITY DOES EQUAL PROTECTION PROTECT? 
The Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall “deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”13 Like any 
other statement of formal equality, the Amendment is incapable of being 
applied without an independent principle of equality that gives normative 
content to the demand for equal protection.14 Said simply, which form of 
equality does the Equal Protection Clause protect? The plaintiffs’ statistical 
evidence proposes what I will refer to as conditional statistical parity 
(borrowing the term from computer scientists) as the proper way to define 
what equal protection demands.15 
The following formalizes what conditional statistical parity means in 
the context of Harvard admission: The university must identify all things that 
it says it values in applicants. Let’s call these valued credentials the Xs.16 The 
 
 13 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 14 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978) (“The concept of ‘discrimination,’ 
like the phrase ‘equal protection of the laws,’ is susceptible of varying interpretations . . . .”). The 
scholarly literature is too extensive to be summarized, but see, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, 
The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination, 2 ISSUES LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP, 2003, at 1; Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal 
Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1063–64 (2011); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal 
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976); Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown Do for 
You?: Neutral Principles and the Struggle over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1051–
52 (2009); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision 
in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L. J. 1278, 1351–52 (2011).  
 15  Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Measure and Mismeasure of Fairness: A Critical Review 
of Fair Machine Learning, 2 ARXIV:1808.00023 [CS.CY], Aug. 14, 2018, at 2, 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1808.00023 [https://perma.cc/W6BJ-82BF]; Cynthia Dwork et al., Fairness Through 
Awareness, ARXIV:1104.3913 [CS.CC], Nov. 30, 2011, at 1, http://arxiv.org/abs/1104.3913 
[https://perma.cc/28V4-F4HX]; Moritz Hardt et al., Equality of Opportunity in Supervised Learning, 
2 ARXIV:1610.02413 [CS.LG], Oct. 11, 2016, at 1, http://arxiv.org/abs/1610.02413 
[https://perma.cc/AX7H-GWW3].  
 16 A logical requirement of this concept of discrimination is that the set of Xs cannot include group-
specific things (credentials that, by definition, only one group could possess, such as having a “white 
upbringing” or “overcoming anti-Black racism”), otherwise it would be a backdoor way to violate the 
principle of fairness they endorse. See, for example, a quote from Edward Blum, President of SFFA, 
explaining that, “[w]e believe that a student’s skin color or ethnic heritage should not be used to help or 
harm that student’s prospects of being admitted to a college or university.” Jay Caspian Kang, Where 
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plaintiffs propose that ‘discrimination’ is defined by a lack of group-based 
statistical parity,17 i.e., equal probability of admission conditional on having 
the same valued credentials between racial groups: 
P(A=1|X=x, G=b) ≠ P(A=1|X=x, G=w) 
Conditional statistical parity is violated when applicants in racial 
groups (on discrete values of G labeled, for example, as b or w) who share 
the same values for all variables rationally related to goals of the institution 
in question (the Xs) do not face the same probability of acceptance, P(A=1). 
Given some of the Supreme Court’s elaborations of the Equal 
Protection Clause over the years, it is hardly surprising that litigants would 
proffer conditional statistical parity to define discrimination. For example, 
“[t]he Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons 
similarly situated should be treated alike.”18 Some Justices in other 
affirmative action cases have discussed statistical facts about admissions in 
a way that suggests they endorse this operationalization of equal protection.19 
Additionally, the Court’s evidentiary demands for equal protection claims in 
other contexts, such as law enforcement, follows the same logic, requiring 
defendants alleging selective enforcement to come forward with evidence 
that people “similarly situated” with respect to rationally relevant 
enforcement criteria and who differ only by race were treated differently.20 
The plaintiffs’ expert report is organized around the definition of 
discrimination as conditional statistical parity between racial groups. There 
is a dizzying amount of data, and ways of analyzing it, in the 700-plus pages 
of expert reports. Nonetheless, the plaintiffs’ approach to adducing statistical 
evidence of discrimination comes down to a pretty straightforward 
 
Does Affirmative Action Leave Asian-Americans?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/magazine/affirmative-action-asian-american-harvard.html 
[https://perma.cc/B8TP-N3K8]. 
 17 See Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6–17, Students for Fair 
Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) (No. 14-
cv-14176-ADB). 
 18 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
 19 The discussion of dissimilar admission rates by race within given LSAT and GPA ranges by the 
dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger perfectly illustrates why litigants might take conditional statistical parity 
to capture the meaning of discrimination in higher education admissions. 539 U.S. 306, 382–85 (2003) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing evidence of “admission of less qualified underrepresented minorities 
in preference to [Petitioner Grutter]” as evidence that “its alleged goal of ‘critical mass’ is simply a sham,” 
and calling the “tight correlation between the percentage of applicants and admittees of a given race,” 
evidence that the law school is admitting students “based on the aspirational assumption that all applicants 
are equally qualified academically, and therefore that the proportion of each group admitted should be 
the same as the proportion of that group in the applicant pool.”). 
 20 See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Thinking 
About Detecting Racial Discrimination, 113 NW. U.L. REV. 1163, 1184–92 (2019) (citing cases where 
similarly situated test was applied). 
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exercise.21 First, plaintiffs seek to show that Asian applicants to Harvard are, 
as a group, more qualified than other applicants grouped by race at least on 
most observable characteristics.22 They mainly focus on academic 
credentials, since Harvard is, after all, an elite academic institution, but they 
also look at things like extracurricular activities, athletics, and high school 
recommendations.23 Then, they seek to show that the probability of 
admission differs between racial groups conditional on having the same 
levels of other observable valued credentials.24 They also seek to show that 
Asian applicants have a lower probability of receiving a more favorable 
“personal”25 or “overall”26 rating from Harvard admissions staff which, in 
turn, affects the probability of admission.27 
Table 1 presents a stylized example of the plaintiffs’ logic of proof. The 
table reflects the average distribution between the four largest applicant 
 
 21 See Expert Report of Peter S. Arcidiacono at 17–21, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President 
& Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) (No. 14-cv-14176-ADB) [hereinafter 
Plaintiff Expert Report] (describing why the expert believes the methods used, especially multinomial 
logistic regressions, are the correct way to detect discrimination). For example, “[b]y controlling for test 
scores, one can show that group A was being held to a higher standard than group B, all else equal.” Id. 
at 18. 
 22 See id. at 26 (Figure 1.2), which shows the average SAT scores of applicants and admits by racial 
groupings. The plaintiffs are clear that their evidence of discrimination is made by comparing all pairings 
of “race” groups. See Rebuttal Expert Report of Peter S. Arcidiacono at 20, Students for Fair Admissions, 
Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) (No. 14-cv-14176-
ADB) [hereinafter Plaintiff Rebuttal Report] (“Understanding Harvard’s use of race in evaluating 
domestic applicants involves distinctions drawn across all four major racial groups in the applicant pool: 
Asian Americans, whites, African Americans, and Hispanics.”) (emphasis in original). 
 23 E.g., Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at 4, 14, 15, 26, 33, 37. 
 24 The simplest way of understanding the logic of this evidence is simply descriptive, such as the 
figure on Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at 31 tbl.2.1, but the same logic applies to more complex 
logistic models. 
 25 While there is no single definition of the “personal” rating, it is a general assessment of “[p]ersonal 
quality” and includes such factors such as whether an individual will “contribute to the class, classroom, 
[or] roommate group,” as well as “integrity, helpfulness, courage, [and] kindness.” Plaintiff Rebuttal 
Report, supra note 22, at 14 n.8; see also Report of David Card, Ph.D. at 20, Students for Fair Admissions, 
Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) (No. 14-cv-14176-
ADB) [hereinafter Harvard Expert Report] (noting that among the “personal qualities” Harvard looks for 
are “economic resources and family hardship, personal essays and interviews, artistic qualities, maturity 
and ability to balance multiple commitments, and the degree of parental involvement . . .”). 
 26 The “overall” rating “is a score that purports to reflect Harvard’s overall assessment of the 
applicant; it is not an average of [the other ratings], but it takes them into account.” Plaintiff Expert 
Report, supra note 21, at 4; see also Harvard Expert Report, supra note 25, at 26 (“Deposition testimony 
indicates that the overall rating (a) takes into account the profile ratings but is not a formulaic summation 
or average of those ratings, and (b) can reflect other aspects of an application that the reviewer considered 
but that are not captured in the profile ratings (including race).”). 
 27 See, e.g., Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at 35–40, 59 (“Receiving a 2 or better on 
Harvard’s overall rating is especially important for an applicant’s chances of admission.”). 
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racial-ethnic groups by academic decile.28 If Harvard exclusively valued 
academic credentials, saved money by dismissing its admissions staff, and 
just admitted the top decile, it would admit the racial-ethnic diversity shown 
in the second to last row, as opposed to the average racial-ethnic makeup of 
its admitted class shown in the last row. The plaintiffs adduce tables like this, 
and more sophisticated statistical exercises like multinomial logistic 
regression, to substantiate the claim that conditional statistical parity 
between racial groups was violated.29 
TABLE 1: AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION OF APPLICANTS BY RACE AND DECILE 30 








Top Decile 726 15 54 1,023 1,818 
Bottom 9 8,012 2,366 2,710 5,095 18,182 
Total 8,738 2,381 2,764 6,118 20,000 
Admit Class of 2,000 
% of each 



























 28 The distributions were made by averaging the 2014–2019 admissions data from Table B.5.7, and 
then applying those distributions to an applicant pool of 20,000, where roughly 2,000 students are 
admitted. Id. at app. B tbl.B.5.7. These numbers roughly correlate with the total size of the applicant pool 
and admitted class at Harvard. A similar table for the entire “baseline” dataset can be found in Table 5.1. 
Id. at 41 tbl.5.1; see also id. at 2 (explaining the plaintiffs’ expert separated applicants into two groups: 
(1) the “baseline,” which was all domestic, regular decision applicants except (a) recruited athletes, (b) 
legacies, (c) Dean’s or Director’s Interest List individuals, and (d) the children of Harvard faculty or staff, 
because these groups experience significantly higher admit rates; and (2) the “expanded” set, which was 
simply all domestic applicants). This is the clearest example of the plaintiffs’ proposed fairness selection 
rule: “[R]andomly drawing from the top academic index decile (in the baseline dataset) would cause 
Asian-American admits to more than double . . . .” Plaintiff Rebuttal Report, supra note 22, at 13. 
 29 See, e.g., Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at 61–68, app. A. 
 30 Despite the use of the terms “African American” and “Asian American” in the case, it should be 
noted that the categories cover a substantial portion of applicants that are either “African” or “Caribbean” 
or from other countries but are considered in the U.S. in the “Black” racial category and all East and Near 
Asian ancestry under “Asian American.” 
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Plaintiffs repeat this logic with the personal ratings.31 Table 2, taken 
directly from the plaintiffs’ expert report, shows the proportion of applicants 
in each academic decile who are given the personal rankings in the top tier 
(a two or higher), broken down by different racial groups. 
TABLE 2: SHARE RECEIVING A TWO OR HIGHER ON THE PERSONAL RATING BY 











1 8.11% 9.49% 8.48% 8.01% 8.81% 
2 12.58% 15.75% 13.16% 12.91% 13.57% 
3 16.25% 23.35% 17.77% 13.46% 17.16% 
4 18.62% 28.95% 20.39% 14.24% 18.91% 
5 20.40% 33.89% 25.60% 15.69% 20.56% 
6 22.72% 35.04% 28.41% 16.46% 21.69% 
7 22.59% 40.00% 30.03% 18.11% 22.01% 
8 26.10% 39.57% 32.20% 17.93% 23.20% 
9 28.23% 40.31% 30.24% 20.87% 24.74% 
10 29.62% 46.97% 34.21% 22.20% 25.46% 
 
Average 21.29% 19.01% 18.69% 17.65% 19.52% 
 
Although the plaintiffs seek to show that conditional statistical parity is 
violated when comparing Asian and white applicants, their most dramatic 
claims of violation are made when comparing Asian and Black applicants: 
Race plays a significant role in admissions decisions. Consider the example of 
an Asian-American applicant who is male, is not disadvantaged, and has other 
characteristics that result in a 25% chance of admission. Simply changing the 
race of this applicant to white—and leaving all his other characteristics the 
same—would increase his chance of admission to 36%. Changing his race to 
Hispanic (and leaving all other characteristics the same) would increase his 
chance of admission to 77%. Changing his race to African-American (again, 
 
 31  See, e.g., Plaintiff Rebuttal Report, supra note 22, at 22 (“[S]imilarly situated African-American 
applicants receive much higher personal ratings than their Asian-American counterparts. African-
American applicants in the third-worst decile receive higher personal ratings than Asian-American 
applicants in the top decile.”) (emphasis in original). 
 32 Id. at app. C tbl.5.6R. 
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leaving all other characteristics the same) would increase his chance of 
admission to 95%.33 
While I have no idea what metaphysical or empirical meaning the 
proposition “simply changing the race of this applicant” could have,34 the 
above quote does have a clear statistical meaning, which is simply that, 
conditional on having some set of observable credentials, white, Hispanic, 
and Black applicants have some [X, Y, and Z respectively] higher probability 
of admission compared to Asian applicants.35 
Harvard and their expert, for the most part, implicitly accept the 
plaintiffs’ definition of discrimination by dedicating most of their report to 
trying to make evidence of unequal conditional statistical parity go away—
at least with respect to comparing Asian to white applicants—basically by 
adding more conditions (Xs) into their model.36 First, they argue that “it is 
difficult to quantify and include in a statistical model many of the non-
academic and contextual factors that Harvard’s admissions process values.”37 
Second, they argue that if we could observe and quantify all of the qualitative 
factors about applicants, then evidence of unequal conditional statistical 
parity would go away.38 As explained below, my problem is not with the 
 
 33 Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at 3 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 34 Id.; see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 20, at 1205–06. Another befuddling example: “Absent 
racial preferences, African-American applicants would be treated as white applicants.” Plaintiff Rebuttal 
Report, supra note 22, at 47. 
 35 See, e.g., Plaintiff Rebuttal Report, supra note 22, at 46 (“Professor Card’s own models show that 
racial preferences are responsible for tripling the number of African-American admits and doubling the 
number of Hispanic admits.”) (emphasis in original). Here, and in many other places, the plaintiffs’ expert 
describes statistical relation that obtains between numbers in a data set as either subjective mental states 
(i.e., “preferences”) or causal relations (i.e., “penalties” or “tips”). 
 36 See generally Harvard Expert Report, supra note 25, at 25–45. For a clear statement of this 
principle, see id. at 39–40. Many of the “contextual factors” that Harvard’s expert adds to his model to 
make evidence of unequal conditional statistical parity go away are things that are partially constitutive 
of racial categories, things such as “the quality of the applicant’s high school, the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the applicant’s high school and neighborhood, and the applicant’s family background.” 
Id. at 33; see also Rebuttal Report of David Card, Ph.D. at 15–17, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019) No. 14-cv-14176-ADB 
[hereinafter Harvard Rebuttal Report]. As the plaintiffs point out, defendants do not claim that there is 
conditional statistical parity when comparing Asian and Black or Hispanic applicants. Instead, the 
defendants argue that race only has an “effect” for those who already have a high probability of admission, 
Harvard Expert Report, supra note 25, at 81, 84, and that “[r]ace is less important than unmeasured, 
individualized factors.” Id. at 85. 
 37 Harvard Expert Report, supra note 25, at 32. 
 38 Id. (“[T]here may well also be racial differences in the many other non-academic factors (like the 
personal essay) that are not observable in the database and that are important to the admissions process 
given the large pool of applicants with extraordinary academic achievements.”). Harvard’s approach to 
making the racial differentials go away is similar for personal ratings, largely arguing that, first, alumni 
ratings are not based on the full record that Harvard admission staff personal and overall ratings are based 
on, and second, the plaintiffs’ models are “quite low in predictive accuracy and do not reliably control 
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methods used to substantiate whether conditional statistical parity is violated 
with respect to particular racial groups, it is with using that as the definition 
of what constitutes denial of equal protection. 
II. SO WHAT’S WRONG WITH CONDITIONAL STATISTICAL PARITY? 
The remainder of this Essay explores what is wrong with adopting 
conditional statistical parity as the substantive principle giving content to 
equal protection on the basis of race in admissions. First, as mentioned in the 
Introduction, adopting conditional parity foreclosed a ruling that could find 
that the plaintiffs’ evidence makes out discrimination between applicants 
grouped by ‘white’ and ‘Asian’ but not, for example, between those grouped 
by ‘white’ and ‘Black’ because the principle demands the same relation of 
equality no matter what relations of inequality constitute the groups in 
question. Said another way, adopting the universal principle of conditional 
statistical parity means that no empirical reason explaining why the 
applicants’ credentials (the Xs) are patterned differently between people 
grouped by race could ever be a normative reason to reject the principle. 
Second, adopting conditional statistical parity is inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s line of cases allowing universities to value racial diversity, 
and it is inconsistent with the entire logic of the graded scrutiny scale in the 
equal protection doctrine. The only reasons we have for heightened moral 
concern with establishing some to-be-specified relation of equality between 
these groups (i.e., people grouped by the concept of ‘race’) is that people so 
grouped have in the past, and currently do, sit in some relation of inequality 
to one other. 
My negative argument about what is wrong with conditional statistical 
parity will also advance my positive argument. A relation of equality 
enshrined in the principle of ‘nondiscrimination’ or ‘equal protection’ 
between people categorized by some grouping is only valid in light of what 
makes the social grouping what it is under current social conditions. 
Therefore, prior to debating the content of a substantive principle of 
nondiscrimination or equal protection with respect to a particular grouping, 
we must first define what constitutes that social group. Only then can we 
ask: Given what this grouping is, what are fair and just ways of making 
decisions in this domain, what goals and interests ought to be recognized as 
legitimate, and are the currently employed means narrowly tailored in the 
right way? 
 
for the many hard-to-measure factors that are likely very important to the determination of the ratings.” 
Id. at 74. 
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Conditional statistical parity will be violated between any two groups 
where one has a lower average credential raking than the other, and Harvard 
seeks to increase admissions of the lower-mean group beyond what would 
be produced by simply admitting on the basis of those credentials alone. 
First, the plaintiffs’ proposed content for the Equal Protection Clause 
gives us no way to normatively differentiate between the following statistical 
facts (taken from Table 2).39 Within the top academic decile of applicants: 
(1) the percent of Black applicants that Harvard staff awards the top two 
personal ratings is 2.1 times higher than the percent of Asian applicants (47% 
vs. 22%); 
(2) the percent of Black applicants that Harvard staff awards the top two 
personal ratings is 1.6 times higher than the percent of white applicants (47% 
vs. 30%); and 
(3) the percent of white applicants that Harvard staff awards the top two 
personal ratings is 1.3 times higher than the percent of Asian applicants (30% 
vs. 22%). 
There is no logical way for a court to find (3) to be evidence of 
discrimination against Asian applicants in favor of white applicants, while at 
the same time declining to find (1) and (2) evidence of discrimination against 
Asian or white applicants in favor of Black or Hispanic applicants, and 
thereby preserve affirmative action for the latter groups, if equal protection 
of the law is violated whenever the relation of conditional statistical parity is 
violated between people grouped by race. 
Second, if equal protection in higher education admissions is defined 
by the relation of conditional parity, then all sorts of groups are being denied 
equal protection by Harvard, such as groupings based on a “disadvantaged” 
versus “not disadvantaged” background, or coming from an under-served, 
nonelite, or low-income geographic region versus coming from a well-
resourced, elite, rich geographic region. Why? Because those groupings are 
characterized by the same statistical differentials as racial groupings: they 
apply to Harvard at different rates with different average academic and other 
valued credentials. 
A. An Analogy to Socioeconomic Class 
Consider the groupings based on a “disadvantaged” versus “not 
disadvantaged” background, which according to the plaintiffs, is a 
designation assigned by the admissions staff “if the reader believes the 
applicant is from a very modest economic background.”40 The plaintiffs 
 
 39 See Plaintiff Rebuttal Report, supra note 22, at app. C tbl.5.6R. 
 40 Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at 3 n.3. 
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report that 12.87% of the applicants in their “baseline dataset” are classified 
as disadvantaged by Harvard admissions staff.41 Here again, if Harvard 
exclusively valued academic credentials, saved money by dismissing its 
admissions staff, and just admitted the top decile, it would produce a pattern 
of admissions with respect to the disadvantaged grouping. For illustrative 
purposes, assume 129 of the 2000 entering freshmen, or roughly 6.4%, 
would be “disadvantaged.” That pattern is simply a feature of the conditional 
distribution of “disadvantaged” within the top decile, which is a fancy way 
of saying that a higher proportion of candidates in the top academic decile 
are “not disadvantaged.” 










Top decile* 1,871 129 2,000 93.75% 6.44% 
Bottom 9 15,555 2,445 18,000 0 0 
Total 17,426 2.574 20,000   
 
Now, if Harvard came to believe that its educational mission cannot be 
served when only 6.4% of the entering class come from disadvantaged 
economic backgrounds and if they accordingly purposefully increased the 
number of disadvantaged admits—which is what it means to be free to value 
socioeconomic diversity—they will have to draw from the lower nine 
academic deciles in order to admit those extra disadvantaged applicants. 
How many? Who knows. That is a subject to debate. But certain 
mathematical facts are going to be true if they increase the number of 
disadvantaged applicants by even one. Namely, the relation of conditional 
statistical parity will be violated between people grouped by 
“disadvantaged” versus “not disadvantaged” status: P(A=1|X=high 
academic, G=not disadvantaged) < P(A=1|X=high academic, 
G=disadvantaged), and P(A=1|X=low academic, G=not disadvantaged) < 
P(A=1|X=low academic, G=disadvantaged). Meaning, within the top 
academic decile, applicants who are not disadvantaged will have a lower 
probability of admissions than applicants who are disadvantaged (indeed, the 
 
 41 Id. at app. A tbl.A.7. The publicly available portions of the expert reports do not report cross-
tabulations of disadvantage and academic rankings, so the stylized example below was constructed 
assuming that a higher percentage of applicants categorized as “not disadvantaged” were in the top 
academic decile (roughly 10%), compared to the percentage of applicants categorized as “disadvantaged” 
(roughly 5%). 
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latter group will have a probability of admission equal to one); and within 
the bottom nine academic deciles, applicants who are disadvantaged will 
face a higher probability of admission than applicants who are not 
disadvantaged (indeed, the latter group will have a probability of admission 
equal to zero). 
It is a feature of the overall applicant distribution that there are more 
applicants in the “not disadvantaged” than “disadvantaged” group (by a 
factor of almost seven to one), and there are significantly more of the former 
within the top academic decile (by a factor of roughly fifteen to one).42 The 
fact that conditional statistical parity will be violated between not 
disadvantaged and disadvantaged applicants does not tell us which of the 
candidates in the underrepresented group will be admitted, but the group-
based conditional probabilities will necessarily be uneven when the group-
based conditional distributions of the other valued factors are different. 
Now, one might note that these tradeoffs are contingent on the marginal 
distribution of disadvantage, i.e., the respective proportions of 
“disadvantaged” versus “not disadvantaged” within each academic decile. If 
one made the proportions of these two groups identical within the top 
academic deciles, then one would not face that tradeoff. Yes, that is true. 
And that is why one needs a theory of the relevant form of groupness before 
one can propose a substantive principle of equality with respect to that form 
of groupness. 
By examining what the groupness of “disadvantaged” is, we see that—
insofar as Harvard is committed to increasing the proportion of its entering 
class from that group—then some tradeoff between admitting applicants on 
the basis of academic ratings and representativeness of “disadvantaged” is 
unavoidable. To be in the category “disadvantaged” is to be ranked with 
respect to attributes such as household financial resources, parents’ social 
prestige, heads of households’ occupations, cultural opportunities, and 
access to elite networks, relative to other people. Those classified in the 
group “disadvantaged” by definition have less of such attributes than those 
classified as “not disadvantaged.” Therefore, the fact that applicants 
designated “not disadvantaged” have a higher proportion of persons that 
score in the top academic decile compared to those designated 
“disadvantaged” is not a random statistical correlation. Having access to high 
quality schools, private tutors, adults (parents or paid childcare workers) who 
have the time and resources to monitor and promote the child’s academic 
success, and cultural capital interpreted as intellectual potential is 
constitutive of what it is to be in the category “not disadvantaged.” There 
 
 42 See infra Table 3. 
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might be some things that are randomly correlated (i.e., without a social 
mechanism to explain it) or not correlated at all with the category—
consumption of mayonnaise, thinking Ariana Grande’s new album is good 
(it’s not), addresses that start with a prime number—but scoring well on 
academic measurements is not one of them.43 This has nothing to do with the 
inherent potential of persons grouped as “disadvantaged;” it is a reflection of 
the social facts that constitute what socioeconomic stratification is.44 
B. Back to Race 
The same is true for race. By examining what the groupness of ‘race’ 
is, one sees that it is not merely a grouping made possible by innate biological 
or genetic facts. Rather, it is a grouping made possible by social and 
economic differentiation that has made certain biological and genetic facts 
emerge as salient cultural designations. This take on what it is to have racial 
categories is often referred to as the social constructivist view, which holds 
that bodily markers of race currently have social meanings only by virtue of 
the specific social, political, cultural, legal, economic, etc. arrangements in 
this particular society. Here in the United States, the history of racial group 
formation is a history of inequality, subjugation, exclusion, and in many 
cases, horrific exploitation. The category ‘white,’ for example, has been 
forged by enslaving, excluding, or legally limiting the life chances of persons 
defined in contradistinction to ‘whiteness,’ through practices from chattel 
slavery, naturalization law limiting citizenship to “free white person[s] . . . 
 
 43 If the correlation between the status “disadvantaged” and academic rankings were merely random 
(like the one we may find between mayonnaise consumption and academic rankings), it would mean there 
are no existing social mechanisms we could point to in order to justify accepting some tradeoff between 
admitting strictly on the basis of academic ranking and “disadvantaged” representativeness. Let’s imagine 
that admitting on the basis of academic credentials alone created a stark pattern of admissions with respect 
to mayo consumption—say Harvard observed that 0% of its freshman class ever consumed any 
mayonnaise. We do not care about that outcome (or should not care, by my lights) because being in the 
group ‘no mayo consumed’ is simply to share some thin preference for a random food condiment. In 
contrast, to be in the group “disadvantaged” is to share a lack of economic and social resources relative 
to another group of people, resources that in our current world have huge implications for life chances. 
So, we care (or should care, by my lights) when admitting on the basis of academic credentials alone 
creates a stark pattern of admissions with respect to “disadvantaged,” but not with respect to mayo 
consumption, because of what the former groupness is. 
 44 This logic is reflected in the College Board’s proposal, which it eventually abandoned, to include 
an “adversity score” for college admissions officers including factors such as “the relative quality of the 
student’s high school and the crime rate and poverty level of the student’s neighborhood.” Anemona 
Hartocollis, SAT’s New ‘Adversity Score’ Will Take Students’ Hardships into Account, N.Y. TIMES (May 
16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/16/us/sat-score.html [https://perma.cc/P77W-KL3L]; see 
also Anemona Hartocollis, SAT ‘Adversity Score’ Is Abandoned in Wake of Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/us/sat-adversity-score-college-board.html 
[https://perma.cc/NS7D-ENYJ]. 
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of good character,”45 and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882,46 to the violent 
subjugation of Mexican, Central, and South American migrants.47 There is 
nothing inherent to the groups that we know of as ‘races’ that created these 
relations of inequality; these practices were historical contingencies. 
The historical contingencies that in fact unfolded help explain the 
contemporary relations of inequality that constitute current racial 
groupings.48 Persistent relations of inequality are reflected in countless social 
science studies of racial disparities—from prenatal care to end-of-life 
palliative care—and include disparities in primary and secondary academic 
measures.49 As shown in Table 1, there are fewer African-American and 
 
 45 An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (repealed 1795); 
see also, United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 209–10 (1923) (holding that the racial 
designation “white” in naturalization statute was in fact a “popular” not “scientific” meaning of the word, 
which “for the practical purposes of the statute, must be applied to a group of living 
persons now possessing in common the requisite characteristics, not to groups of persons who are 
supposed to be or really are descended from some remote, common ancestor, but who, whether they both 
resemble him to a greater or less extent, have, at any rate, ceased altogether to resemble one another,” in 
an action by the government to cancel the citizenship of someone of “high caste Hindu stock, born in 
Punjab, one of the extreme northwestern districts of India, and classified by certain scientific authorities 
as of the Caucasian or Aryan race.”); Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 195–96 (1922) 
(interpreting the first naturalization act of 1790 limiting citizenship to “free white persons” and holding 
that although it was adopted at the time “it was employed by them for the sole purpose of excluding the 
black or African race and the Indians then inhabiting this country,” it should be interpreted to mean that 
“only free white persons shall be included,” and therefore, “the brown or yellow races of Asia” are 
necessarily ineligible for citizenship). 
 46 Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943); see also Kitty Calavita, The 
Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity, and “Passing”: Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882–1910, 
25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 10–14 (2000). 
 47 See, e.g., MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN 
IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE (1998); IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (10th ed. 2006). 
 48 This is why Justice O’Connor’s optimistic sunsetting of the use of race-conscious admissions 
policies in Grutter seemed so out of touch with the actual reality of persistent and entrenched racial 
equality. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341–42 (2003). “[W]e are nowhere close to the kind of 
sustained improvement in opportunities for people of color that would justify Justice O’Connor’s 
optimism.” Elise C. Boddie, The Future of Affirmative Action, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 38, 43-44 (2016). 
The Court’s own limits on policies explicitly dedicated to achieving racial equality are one of the main 
impediments to achieving that world. See, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Fisher’s Cautionary Tale 
and the Urgent Need for Equal Access to an Excellent Education, 130 HARV. L. REV. 185, 188 (2016). 
 49 STEADY GAINS AND STALLED PROGRESS: INEQUALITY AND THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 
(Katherine Magnuson & Jane Waldfogel eds., 2008); William A. Grobman et al., Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Maternal Morbidity and Obstetric Care, 125 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1460, 1466 
(2015); Melissa A. LoPresti et al., End-of-Life Care for People with Cancer from Ethnic Minority Groups: 
A Systematic Review, 33 AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE MED. 291, 301 (2016); Alexander K. Smith et 
al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in End-of-Life Care in Fee-for-Service Medicare Beneficiaries with 
Advanced Cancer, 57 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 153, 156–57 (2009); Linda Villarosa, Why America’s 
Black Mothers and Babies Are in a Life-or-Death Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/magazine/black-mothers-babies-death-maternal-mortality.html 
[https://perma.cc/3F5P-THC6]. 
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Hispanic applicants to Harvard relative to white and Asian applicants, and a 
much smaller proportion of the former two groups are in the top academic 
decile relative to the latter two. One explanation is that race and ethnicity 
groupings are highly correlated with the “disadvantaged” status. According 
to the plaintiffs’ expert report, about 6% of the white applicants are 
categorized as “disadvantaged,” compared to 11% of the Asian applicants, 
almost 30% of the African-American applicants, and 25% of the Hispanic 
applicants.50 In the language of constructivism, to be in a designated racial 
category in America is not merely to have some set of physical features or 
genetic markers. It also includes standing in a particular probabilistic relation 
to academic achievement by virtue of certain social, cultural, or economic 
arrangements.51 The strong correlation between disadvantage and African-
American and Hispanic designations is not a random, surprising co-
occurrence. For a constructivist, the racial patterns in academic ranking do 
not reflect anything about biological or genetic facts, much less inherent 
capacity for academic excellence. They reflect the very social facts that make 
racial groupings what they are in the United States. 
Therefore, if race is a category made possible by, among other things, 
social and economic stratification, then there is no good normative reason to 
adopt conditional statistical parity as the principle of what equal protection 
demands for these groups in this domain.52 
This brings me to the second reason to reject conditional statistical 
parity to define denial of equal protection on the basis of race in admissions: 
it is irreconcilable with the doctrine of strict scrutiny for racial classifications 
and the Supreme Court’s tolerance of a university’s prerogative to pursue 
“the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.”53 
 
 50 Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at app. B tbl.B.3.1. 
 51 As the entire field of “neighborhood effects” has shown, individual-level disadvantage 
designations fail to capture the true social meaning of concentrated, intergenerational disadvantage, 
especially for African-Americans. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO 
AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 97–121 (2012); PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: 
URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 91–136 (2013). 
 52 Few constructivists would hold that racial categories exists only by virtue of economic inequality. 
 53 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). I say “tolerance” because recognition of this value 
as a compelling state interest has been narrowly eked out over the years. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of 
Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013) [hereinafter Fisher I] (stating that “the decision to pursue ‘the 
educational benefits that flow from student body diversity,’ that the University deems integral to its 
mission is, in substantial measure, an academic judgment to which some, but not complete, judicial 
deference is proper”) (internal citations omitted). 
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C. Conditional Statistical Parity Cannot Be Reconciled with the Doctrine 
of Strict Scrutiny and the Freedom to Value Racial Diversity 
It is a mathematical fact that conditional statistical parity will be 
violated between any two groups whenever one group has a lower average 
ranking than the other on valued credentials (the Xs), and a university seeks 
to increase admissions of that group. But race is a special form of groupness 
under the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Equal Protection Clause to mean that, the “government may treat people 
differently because of their race only for the most compelling reasons.”54 So, 
it is one thing if conditional statistical parity is violated between the groups 
‘rural Kentucky applicants’ and ‘Upper East Side Manhattan applicants,’ or 
between the groups ‘disadvantaged applicants’ and ‘not disadvantaged 
applicants,’ because the latter groupings are only subject to rational basis 
review.55 But, it is another thing when conditional statistical parity is violated 
between racial groups because the Supreme Court has held that, “all racial 
classifications are categorically prohibited unless they are ‘necessary to 
further a compelling governmental interest’ and ‘narrowly tailored to that 
end.’”56 
But SFFA cannot have it both ways by appealing to the special 
significance of categorization on the basis of race to trigger a searching 
consideration of its use, and then denying the special significance of the 
category of race when it comes to giving content to which form of equality 
equal protection protects. Equal protection doctrine assumes that the state 
can use all sorts of groupings and classifications—such as on the basis of 
ascribed cognitive or mental disability,57 or number of years operating a food 
pushcart in the French Quarter of New Orleans.58 Although “the wholly 
 
 54 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 55 “A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively 
supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the State’s system 
be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973). 
 56 Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 316 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
 57 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 442 (1985) (holding that 
because “[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the 
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest” the court of appeals 
“erred in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of 
judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation”). 
 58 See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 299, 305 (1976) (holding that the 
“grandfather provision” of a New Orleans statute banning pushcarts that have not been in operation for 
more than twenty years from the historic French Quarter was not a “totally arbitrary and irrational method 
of achieving the city’s purpose,” which was “to preserve its distinctive charm, character, and economic 
vitality,” notwithstanding the fact that the categorization differentially harmed pushcart operators on the 
basis of a grouping that was not necessarily going to assure the preferred operators would respect the 
traditions or preserve the distinctive historical character any more than the disfavored operators). 
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arbitrary act[s]” can in theory be struck down under rational basis review,59 
the deference enshrined in rational basis review doctrine presumes that 
classifications as such are not problematic and, accordingly, most forms of 
grouping are not properly policed by the federal judiciary for rationality or 
random meanness. If racial groups only reflected groupings made purely on 
the basis of innate features presumed to have some link to ancestral 
geographic origin or common genetic structure, then there would be no 
reason to subject this grouping to strict scrutiny as opposed to rational basis 
review. And if what is wrong with the state using a particular form of 
grouping is merely that a state actor (or private actor with state funding) is 
demonstrating irrationality or even meanness by differentiating between 
people so grouped, then why care more when the grouping is race than when 
it is years of owning a pushcart? 
The graded scrutiny scale in equal protection doctrine tracks social 
categories where our moral reasons for being extra concerned about state 
action have everything to do with the social facts that make those groupings 
what they are—namely, groupings of past and current stratification, 
oppression, and inequality. Only when the groupness has a certain quality do 
we think there might be good reasons to overcome deference to legislative 
judgements, separation of powers, liberal pluralism, federalism, or the 
prerogatives of private institutions about how to articulate and pursue their 
missions.60 
But SFFA wants to have it both ways with equal protection doctrine. 
They rely on the doctrine of strict scrutiny to get massive discovery from 
Harvard about its admissions practices because it uses the racial status of 
applicants to make admissions decisions, and to demand narrow tailoring of 
the use of racial classifications. But then—when it comes to debating which 
substantive principle should give content to equal protection between groups 
classified in this domain (i.e., what purposes are legitimate and which means 
are narrowly tailored in the right way)—they ignore the moral reasons why 
the doctrine exists for the classification of race but not for years of pushcart 
ownership. My argument is simply that one needs to take account of what 
constitutes the relevant form of groupness in any proposal about what the 
correct relation of equality ought to be between people grouped in that way. 
Adopting my argument does not dictate the content of what equal 
protection demands in college admissions. However, it does, as in the 
 
 59 Id. at 304 (“[T]he wholly arbitrary act . . . cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 60 “In short, the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of 
legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along 
suspect lines . . . .” Id. at 303. 
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example of socioeconomic class above, mean that we cannot have the debate 
about what criteria are fair vis-à-vis different groups or what adequate 
narrow tailoring ought to look like by assuming away the social facts that 
constitute the groups about which a party is charging discrimination. Just as 
one cannot debate what selection criteria would be fair vis-à-vis the groups 
“disadvantaged” and “not disadvantaged” by assuming equal or average 
resources between their members, one cannot debate what selection criteria 
would be fair vis-à-vis groups designated as ‘races’ by assuming equal social 
and economic resources because the latter, like the former, is a social 
classification system partially constituted by some form of stratification. 
There was a glimmer of recognition of this fact in Fisher II, where the 
Court held that “a university may institute a race-conscious admissions 
program as a means of obtaining ‘the educational benefits that flow from 
student body diversity.’”61 If Harvard believes that it cannot reap “the 
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body,”62 by relying just 
on academic credentials to produce a freshman class that consists of .075% 
Black and 2.7% Hispanic students,63 then the only candidates that can 
“diversify” the freshman class along racial lines are the ones classified in the 
underrepresented groups under a scheme valuing only academic credentials 
(or whatever other valued credentials are unequal by racial groupings). As 
shown in Table 1, any steps taken towards that end—even as small as 
admitting one additional black or Hispanic student—will violate conditional 
statistical parity. 
Moreover, the only facts that the Court has recognized as justifying the 
continued use of “race-conscious” admissions plans are the currently 
stratified social conditions of people classified by race. Fisher II put 
universities on notice that they “must continue to use [admissions] data to 
scrutinize the fairness of its admissions program; to assess whether changing 
demographics have undermined the need for a race-conscious policy . . . .”64 
Meaning, if the presently existing inequalities that are responsible for the 
differentials in academic credentials between racial groupings ceased to 
exist, then, according to these Supreme Court justices, there would no longer 
be a legitimate reason to tolerate “race conscious” admissions plans. The 
social inequalities that are responsible for the unequal racial composition 
within the applicant pool’s top academic decile, to which the plaintiffs’ point 
to prove conditional statistical parity is being violated, are the very same 
 
 61 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210 (2016) [hereinafter Fisher II] (internal 
citations omitted). 
 62 Fisher I, 570 U.S. 297, 297 (2013). 
 63 See Plaintiff Expert Report, supra note 21, at tbl.5.3. 
 64 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214. 
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social inequalities that justify the continued use of race to produce racial 
diversity under the Supreme Court’s logic.65 
CONCLUSION 
This case is, to my knowledge, one of the most notable affirmative 
action cases ever to proceed almost exclusively on the basis of statistical 
evidence. The district court’s ruling preserved affirmative action for today. 
But I fear its reasoning and treatment of statistical evidence threatens future 
civil rights plaintiffs. The pages and pages of descriptive statistics and the 
debates over the proper specification of logistic regressions—which 
marginal effects to estimate, what variables to interact, or how to pool the 
data—obscured a much deeper question that must, logically, premise the 
entire evidentiary enterprise. That question is: What relation of equality are 
we looking for in all of this evidence? 
SFFA’s expert reports and filings go to great lengths to highlight the 
violation of conditional statistical parity between Asian and Black 
applicants.66 Yet, the court’s opinion almost exclusively focuses on 
adjudicating statistical evidence about the conditional statistical parity 
between Asian and white applicants, saying almost nothing about the 
former.67 But without explaining why it is normatively (and legally) 
justifiable to reject this principle as the instantiation of what equal protection 
demands—in this domain and between these groups—the opinion fails to 
address the central issue in the case. 
The statistical evidence showing that Harvard is pursuing racial 
diversity in the context of racial inequality is not inconsistent with their 
admissions officers harboring and relying on stereotypes about Asian 
applicants.68 Indeed, it would be surprising if this was not the case, given that 
living in a racialized society means that we all harbor stereotypes about racial 
groups.69 But the mathematical upshot of pursuing racial diversity given the 
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distribution of the academic credentials by group has similar implications for 
evaluating the statistical evidence showing that conditional statistical parity 
is violated between groups in the “personal” and “overall” ratings as it was 
for the probability of admission. If one group makes out a very high 
proportion of the top ranking along one dimension—namely academic 
ratings—and if ordinal ranking on the other rankings is done to narrow the 
class of eligible candidates in order to award a scarce resource (admission), 
those rankings must necessarily reflect other diversity criteria the institution 
purports to value.70 That is, one would expect that some of the other metrics 
used to quantify the value that “personal” dimensions would add to 
Harvard’s diversity goal to be positively correlated with membership in the 
groups that would be underrepresented if Harvard just relied on academic 
metrics.71 
One might even see the personally demeaning character of having to 
value racial diversity through assignment of some amorphous thing called 
“personal rating,” the upshot of the Supreme Court’s disjointed doctrine. The 
Court’s affirmative action doctrine disallows universities from pursuing a 
“quota or a goal”72 in racial composition, or engaging in “racial balancing,”73 
but does allow for consideration of race as “but a ‘factor of a factor of a 
factor’ in the holistic-review calculus.”74 As foreshadowed by the dissenting 
Justices in Gratz, the Court’s prior decisions demand admissions procedures 
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that necessarily suffer from the “disadvantage of deliberate obfuscation.”75 
In this case, there is a dignitary distortion to applicants on the basis of race 
when the only way to pursue the laudable and constitutional goal of diversity 
involves devaluing other applicants on the basis of an assessment of 
unnamed “personal” traits.76 
This leads to a final question: Is there no way Harvard can achieve racial 
diversity using race-neutral means? For the life of me, I have never 
understood what a speaker could possibly mean by the designation of certain 
factors as “race-neutral” in the context of exploring mechanisms that can 
achieve racial diversity. If the factor is not correlated with race and there is 
no social mechanism connecting race and the factor, then it will not, by 
definition, serve any function whatsoever towards the goal of achieving 
racial diversity.77 If the factor is correlated with race and if there is a social 
mechanism that produces that correlation (as opposed to it being a random 
statistical fluke), it cannot be reasonably labeled “race-neutral.” There is no 
“race-neutral” means of achieving the end of racial diversity.78 To insist on 
individualism, colorblindness, race neutrality, and the like in the face of a 
charge of racial injustice is nonresponsive. It can mean one of two things: 
either the speaker does not understand what the form of groupness called 
‘race’ references in our society, or the speaker understands, and nevertheless 
thinks zero weight should be given to that form of groupness in moral and 
political affairs. The only way to argue about what racial equality or 
nondiscrimination requires is to first inquire into how that form of social 
groupness is currently constituted, and then to debate what is fair and just in 
a specific domain given those facts. 
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